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Foreign Wives, Domestic Violence:
U.S. Law Stigmatizes and Fails to Protect
"Mail-Order Brides"
Olga Grosh*
I. INTRODUCTION
Susanna Remerata met her husband, Timothy Blackwell, through an
online international marriage brokerage firm.' They wrote letters to each
other for one year before meeting in 1994.2 They married three days after,
and Susanna left her native Philippines to live with her new husband in
Washington state. 3 The marriage was violent and short-lived. Physical
abuse started when Blackwell choked her the day after their wedding.4
Susanna reported the abuse and obtained a protective order.' While waiting
for divorce proceedings outside of a Seattle courtroom, Blackwell shot and
killed Susanna and two of her friends.6 Susanna was eight months
pregnant; but the doctors were unable to save the unborn girl.

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
2008, The College of William and Mary. I dedicate this Note to my mother, Irene
Kaznachey, who bestowed upon me the priceless gifts of life and love. I feel immeasurable
gratitude toward my family, whose love and constant support have and always will guide
me. I also owe a big thank you to Ciardn Pratt for advice, and to Kathryn Edwards and
David Nims for exceptional editing.
1. Timothy Egan, Mail-OrderMarriage, Immigrant Dreams and Death, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/26/world/mail-order-marriage-immigrantdreams-and-death.html?pagewanted=1.
2. Illustrative Cases of Women and Their Children Exploited and Abused Through the
InternationalMarriageBroker Industry, TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., http://www.tahirih.org/site/
wp-content/uploads/2009/03/casestories.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) [hereinafter
TAHIRIH, Illustrative Cases].

3. Id.; Egan, supra note 1.
4. TAHIRIH, Illustrative Cases,supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id. Blackwell was found guilty on three counts of aggravated first-degree murder
and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Anna Koch, et al., Killer's Life
Influenced Jurors-BlackwellAvoids Death Penalty; Jury Splits Decision, SEATTLE TIMES,
June 19, 1996, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960619&slug
=2335289.
7. Jack Hopkins, Blackwell Expected His Death: Suspect Had a Will with Him at the
Courthouse, SEATTLE P-I, Mar. 7, 1995, at Al, http://www.seattlepi.com/archives/1995/950
3070065.asp.
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Susanna's story is unfortunately not unique. Foreign brides who meet
future spouses over the Internet, frequently known as "mail-order brides,"9
are three to six times more likely to experience domestic violence than
other women in the United States.10 Politicians, academics, and nongovernmental organizations have successfully lobbied to change
immigration law and to provide better resources to prevent immigrant bride
abuse."
Although monumental, these legislative strides have proven
inadequate. The efficacy of the laws providing foreign brides with
protection from domestic violence is severely hindered by conflict with
immigration law. One particular problem is the stigma and skepticism with
which immigration law approaches marriages involving foreign brides.
Additionally, lack of efficient regulation of the international marriage
brokerage industry fosters the power imbalance that drives domestic abuse
in foreign bride marriages.
This Note argues that the anti-violence laws intended to protect
immigrant brides are of limited use as tools of empowerment because U.S.
immigration law stigmatizes foreign bride marriages as fraudulent, thus
diminishing the brides' rights and protections against abuse. Part II
provides an overview of the Internet-based international marriage
brokerage industry. Part III discusses how U.S. immigration laws enable
stigmatization of marriages involving immigrant brides. Part IV analyzes
how this stigma endangers the immigrant brides' lives and legal rights.
Part V finds current regulation of international marriage brokers
insufficient to stem stigmatization. Finally, Part VI proposes remedies to
lift this stigma by improving immigration and international marriage broker
regulation, as well as eliminating the power imbalance that drives abuse in
marriages between U.S. men and foreign women.

8. See TAHIRIH, Illustrative Cases, supra note 2 (describing brutal murders of foreign
brides throughout the United States).
9. Although "mail-order bride" is a term commonly used to describe foreign fianc6es or
new brides who meet husbands through Internet matchmaking sites, this Note will refer to
these women as "foreign spouses," "irmmigrant brides," etc., to arrest the notion that women
should be "ordered" like catalogue items.
10. Frequently Asked Questions: InternationalMarriageBroker Regulation Act of 2005
(IMBRA) 3, TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER, http://www.tahirih.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2009/

03/frequentlyaskedquestionsaboutimbra.pdf, (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) [hereinafter
TAHIRI, IMBRA] ("[Albuse rates in marriages between U.S. citizens and foreign women
are approximately three times higher than in the general U.S. population."). Compare with
Daniel Epstein, Romance is Dead: Mail Order Brides and Surrogate Corpses, 17 BUFF. J.
GENDER L. & Soc. POL'Y 61, 77 (2009) ("In the United States, mail-order brides are six
times more likely to experience domestic violence than other women.").
11. See Human Trafficking: Mail Order Bride Abuses Hearing on S. 1455 Before
Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th
Cong. 5-7 (2004) [hereinafter MOB Abuses Hearing] (statement of Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Senator).
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIL-ORDER BRIDE INDUSTRY
A. ASIAN PICTURE BRIDES
The U.S. foreign bride industry began in the early twentieth century,
during the Industrial Revolution and the California Gold Rush. 12 Isolated
Japanese and Korean laborers sought brides from their native countries. 13
Although restrictive immigration policies stringently limited the inflow of
Asian immigrants, in 1907 the Gentleman's Agreement between the United
States and Japan permitted immigrant workers already residing in the
United States to import their wives. 14 A laborer's only options for
acquiring a wife were to travel back home to marry, or to write to a
matchmaker and arrange a marriage through the mail.15 Japanese and
Korean women seeking to escape spinsterhood16 and harsh economic
conditions 7 submitted to a new arranged marriage ritual in which, due to
the distance and expense involved, the bride and groom would exchange
photographs through the mail.' 8 The couple would then "marry" in their
native country, often with a proxy, or sometimes just a photograph,
standing in for the groom.' 9
Upon arrival to the United States, the brides frequently discovered their
grooms' photos to be misleading. 20 The grooms were often ten to fifteen
years older than their portraits, and their financial positions were much
worse than the brides were led to believe. 21 The brides were legally bound
to their new husbands and could not terminate the marital contracts.22

12. Suzanne H. Jackson, To Honor and Obey: Trafficking in "Mail-OrderBrides." 70
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 475, 484 (2002).
13. Id. at 484-85.
14. Id. at 484.
15. Sue Ferguson, From Japan, to Meet a New Husband, MACLEAN'S 48, 51 (Oct. 28,
2002).
16. Id.
17. Yuji Ichioka, Amerika Nadeshiko: JapaneseImmigrant Women in the United States,
1900-1924, 49 PAC. HIST. REv. 339, 345 (1980).
18. Jackson, supra note 12, at 485; Ichioka, supra note 17, at 342.
19. Jackson, supra note 12, at 485; Ichioka, supra note 17, at 343.
20. Alice Yun Chai, Women's History in Public: "Picture Brides" of Hawaii, 16
WOMEN'S STuD. Q. 51, 52 (1988) (commenting that the grooms and the matchmakers
intentionally misled the women who would not have immigrated had they known about the
squalid conditions they would be living in). See generally PIcTuRE BRIDE (Miramax Home
Entertainment 2004) based on a true story of a sixteen-year-old Japanese girl who upon
arrival to Hawaii discovered that her new husband was twenty years older than she and was
a sugar cane worker as opposed to the rich plantation owner he purported to be.
21. Ichioka, supra note 17, at 347; Alice Yun Chai, "Mrs.K ": Oral History ofa Korean
Picture Bride, 7 WOMEN'S STUDIES NEWSLETTER 10, 11 (1979) [hereinafter Yun Chai,
"Mrs. K. "]. Mrs. K., a picture bride, recounts her disappointment when she arrived in
Hawaii in 1923 at the age of nineteen to find that the photo of her husband she received in
Korea was taken twenty years prior. Id. She says, "I was so disappointed that I don't look
at him again. So I don't eat and only cry for eight days." Id.
22. Yun Chai, "Mrs. K., " supra note 21, at 11 ("[T]hey make us work like animals. ...
Hard work but only less than 1/2 pay to women.").
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B. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL MARRIAGE BROKER INDUSTRY
Today, international marriage brokers (IMBs) play the matchmakers
between foreign brides and male U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents.
In 1999, over two hundred U.S.-based agencies matched U.S. men with
four thousand to six thousand women from Asia and Eastern Europe. 23 In
2005, the number of IMBs operating in the U.S. grew to over five hundred,
with an estimated two thousand and seven hundred IMBs operating worldwide.24 In 2009, DHS reported that 27,754 foreign fianc6(e)s and 15,419
foreign spouses entered the United States. 25 Foreign brides comprise onethird to one-half of the foreign fianc6(e)s and spouses admitted to the
United States.2 6
IMBs actively recruit women from economically depressed regions to
27
These businesses then create databases with the
marry foreign men.
women's personal information and, most importantly, their photographs.28
Male customers may search according to factors such as age, weight,
nationality, hair color,2 9 and even breast size and underwear preferences. 30
Some sites require women to fill out questionnaires asking, "Do you wear
makeup?" or "Have you experienced premarital sex?" 3 ' Once a male
customer decides he is interested in a woman, he pays the broker a fee to
obtain her contact information. 32 IMBs also offer package tours for male

23. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, COMMISSIONER OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND DIRECTOR OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE,
INTERNATIONAL MATCHMAKING ORGANIZATIONS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (1999),
http://www.uscis.gov/ files/article/Mobrept-full.pdf [hereinafter INS REPORT].
24. Vanessa Brocato, Profitable Proposals:Explaining and Addressing the Mail Order
Bride Industry Through InternationalHuman Rights Law, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 225, 229
(2004).
25. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: 2009,
TABLE 25: NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS BY CLASS OF ADMISSIONS: FISCAL YEARS 2000-2009

(June 15, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk9NI.shtm.
26. TAHIRIH, IMBRA, supra note 10, at 1-2.
27. Roxanne Sims, Note, A Comparison of Laws in the Philippines,the U.S.A., Taiwan,
andBelarus to Regulate the Mail-OrderBride Industry, 42 AKRON L. REV. 607, 613 (2009);
Karen M. Morgan, Note, Here Comes the Mail-OrderBride: Three Methods of Regulation
in the United States, the Philippines, and Russia, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 423, 424
(2007).
28. Sims, supra note 27, at 613; Morgan, supra note 27, at 425.
29. InternationalMarriage Broker Regulation Act: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., 149 Cong. Rec. S9.960-01 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) [hereinafter IMBRA
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Maria Cantwell).
30. Holli B. Newsome, Recent Development, Mail Dominance: A Critical Look at the
InternationalMarriageBroker Regulation Act and Its Sufficiency in CurtailingMail-Order
Bride Domestic Abuse, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 291, 294 (2007).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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clients interested in visiting women in their home countries, 33 and help
procure entry visas for the selected brides.34
C. THE CONSUMER HUSBANDS
Men who use IMBs to shop for wives come primarily from Australia,
These clients are usually
the European Union, and the United States.
Consumer
white, educated, economically successful, and middle-aged.
husbands from the United States favor foreign women because they think
U.S. women are more interested in their careers than family, while foreign
women desire nothing more than to be homemakers.3 7 "It all started with
women's lib.... Guys are sick of the North American me, me, me
attitude," said Sam Smith, who founded "I Love Latins," an international
matchmaking website.3 8 John Line, a forty-three-year-old from California
explained, "I wanted a wife who isn't career-oriented, who participates
very little in the world outside, who doesn't have high aspirations, who is
useful, whose life revolves around me.... And yes, she had to be a
virgin." 39 Line married a twenty-three-year-old Filipina and admitted to
strictly controlling her access to money, the telephone, and the car.40
Randall Miller, a Washington D.C. lawyer who represented an abused
immigrant bride, explains, "The guy doesn't have to be a predator .... He
wants to be the king of the house and buys into promotional claim that he
can get a more traditional woman in Russia-she will cook dinner and have
sex and otherwise shut up."4 1 The consumer husband is "taken aback when
the woman is outspoken and has opinions and wants to get a job."42 The

33. Some of these package tours are really prostitution rings. Morgan, supra note 27, at
427. Consequently, some IMBs have acquired reputations as "meat markets" for easy sex.

Id.
34. Newsome, supra note 30, at 294.
35. IMBRA Hearing,supra note 29; Morgan, supra note 27, at 425.
36. Robert J. Scholes, Appendix A: The "Mail-OrderBride" Industry and its Impact on
US. Immigration, in U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL, COMMISSIONER OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND DIRECTOR OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE,
INTERNATIONAL MATCHMAKING ORGANIZATIONS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1999). A
survey of six hundred and seven U.S. men who used IMBs to which two hundred and six
men responded revealed: the median age of the male clients was thirty-seven, ninety-four
percent of the male clients were white, fifty percent had two or more years of college, and
forty-two percent were in professional or managerial positions. Id. The men surveyed came
from forty-four states and were politically and ideologically conservative. Id. See also
Eduardo Porter, Law on Overseas Brides is Keeping Couples Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com (search "law on overseas bride is keeping couples apart").
37. Scholes, supra note 36, at 3.
38. Porter, supra note 36.
39. Raymond A. Joseph, New Addresses: American Men Find Asian Brides Fill the
UnliberatedBill-Mail-Order Firms Help Them Look for the Ideal Women They Didn't
Findat Home, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at 1.
40. Id. at 22.
41. Porter, supra note 36.
42. Id.
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gap between reality and grooms' expectations of subservient women is an
invitation to violence.43
D. THE IMMIGRANT BRIDES
Foreign women in the export countries are typically unemployed due to
national economic distress, uncontrolled gender subordination, and few
work and educational opportunities for women." Some women seek to
emigrate in order to escape poverty stemming from legal and social
practices, such as preferential treatment of sons regarding inheritance.45
These women generally come from financially destitute regions, and are
often young. Some have no post-secondary education.46 Unlike the
consumer grooms, the women pay no fee to the marriage brokers.47
Brokers recruit potential brides through newspapers, magazines, and
Internet advertisements that promise a foreign husband.48
Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Philippines are the major sources of
foreign brides. 4 9 According to a study of IMBs in the former Soviet Union
republics, women from this region are recruited for their European
appearance.o Women are also chosen from urban tourist areas because
they have had more contact with U.S. culture.s' In the Philippines,
approximately three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand Filipinas
leave each year as foreign brides, 52 hoping to find a U.S. suitor who will
help them escape the "plain facts of unemployment, inflation, malnutrition,
IMBs'
and militarization [that] permeate their everyday lives." 5 3
recruitment practices take advantage of women who seek emigration as a
solution to limited opportunities and desperate lifestyles in their home
countries.
E. IMPACT OF THE MAIL-ORDER BRIDE INDUSTRY ON FOREIGN WOMEN
Immigrant brides are three to six times more likely to experience
domestic violence than other women.54 In fact, these figures may be much
lower than the actual number of incidents of domestic violence against
immigrant brides as many go unreported due to language difficulties and

43. Porter, supra note 36.
44. Newsome, supra note 30, at 297.
45. Eddy Meng, Note, Mail-OrderBrides: Gilded Prostitutionand the Legal Response,
28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 203 (1994).
46. Morgan, supra note 27, at 424. Some IMB websites advertise brides as young as
thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen years old. Id.
47. Id. at 425.
48. Newsome, supra note 30, at 294.
49. Sims, supra note 27, at 614-15.
50. MOB Abuses Hearing,supra note 11, at 8 (statement of Donna M. Hughes).
51. Id.
52. Sims, supra note 27, at 615.
53. Meng, supra note 45, at 203 (internal quotations omitted).
54. See TAHIiUH, IMBRA, supra note 10, at 3; Epstein, supra note 10, at 77 n.81.
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the threat of deportation if the marriage is dissolved.55 The growth of the
mail-order bride industry has spurred abuse of immigrant brides because
U.S. men who have money to purchase foreign wives are empowered by
the industry to exert substantial control over their new wives. 56 An
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) report documented that the
men who use IMB services "seek relationships with women whom they
feel they can control."5
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the agency
responsible for immigration matters today,s considers IMBs different from
dating services or personal advertisements. Foreign bride marriages create
grossly imbalanced relationships where "the consumer husband holds all
the cards."5 9 Men seeking control choose women who come from
economically poor regions, where a woman does not have many
alternatives to support herself and her family.6 0 The immigrant brides have
no family or support networks, and lack the language skills and
61
employment opportunities necessary for financial independence.
Furthermore, the brokers provide little or no immigration information to the
women because the companies are more concerned with satisfying their
paying male customers than with protecting the brides.6 2 As a result, many
immigrant brides arrive unaware of their immigration rights and remain in
abusive relationships because they think their only other option is
63
deportation.

55. European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361 (N.D.
Ga. 2007).
56. Epstein, supra note 10, at 62.
57.

INS REPORT, supranote 23, at 7.

58. As of March 1, 2003, the INS no longer exists and its functions have transferred to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACTS
FOR MARCH 1, 2003, Feb. 28, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0100.
shtm. USCIS, a DHS agency, currently oversees naturalization, immigration of family
members, international adoptions, and granting immigrants the right to work. USCIS,
"What We Do," Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.uscis.gov ("About Us" hyperlink; then follow
"What We Do"). Author will continue to cite to the INS when referring to policies
promoted or reports produced by the INS prior to its disbandment.
59. Epstein, supra note 10, at 73.
60. Christina Del Vecchio, Note, Match Made in Cyberspace: How Best to Regulate the
InternationalMail-OrderBride Industry, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 177, 189-90 (2007)
(citing economic factors as the main force behind women's decision to seek emigration
opportunities).
61. Christine S. Y. Chun, Comment, The Mail-OrderBride Industry: The Perpetuation
of TransnationalEconomic Inequalities and Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1155,
1159 (1996); Leslye E. Orloff and Janice V. Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal
Protectionsfor Battered Immigrant Women: A History ofLegislative Responses, 10 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 95, 97 (2001).

62. European Connections, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 ("The profit incentives of IMBs are
presently skewed to satisfy the male client rather than to safeguard the women they recruit.").
63. Epstein, supra note 10, at 63.
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Moreover, the IMB industry perpetuates the idea that men can own and
profit from women as sexual objects, reinforcing the discarded notion of
coverture. Many of the websites that catalogue brides are venues for
pornography and prostitution, and many brides fall victim to sex
trafficking. 4 Some brokers openly market the potential brides as "sexual
objects, dedicated to subservience and solely oriented toward pleasing the
man."65 Others "sell" women like produce at a supermarket, asking if the
customer wants to "add" a particular woman to his shopping cart. Others
advertise the process of searching their "voluminous database as easy as
ordering a pizza."6 7 This process replete with sexual images and the great
cost of acquiring an immigrant bride reinforce the belief that the consumer
husband has purchased and now owns his wife.68
Informational and power imbalances common in IMB matches increase
the incidence of domestic violence above the national average. 6 9 The rest
of this Note focuses on the friction between protection against domestic
violence and immigration law's skepticism of the intent behind foreign
bride marriages. Although Congress has passed legislation to help reduce
the power imbalance, immigration law still stigmatizes foreign brides and
deters them from legal recourse when confronted with situations of
domestic violence.
III. IMMIGRATION LAW STIGMATIZES FOREIGN BRIDE
MARRIAGES AS FRAUDULENT
A. MARRIAGE FRAUD FOR IMMIGRATION BENEFITS
To promote family unity, United States immigration laws bestow
certain advantages on family-sponsored immigrants. For example, while

64. INS REPORT, supra note 23, at 1-3. See Kirsten M. Lindee, Note, Love, Honor, or
Control: Domestic Violence, Trafficking, and the Question of How to Regulate the MailOrdered Bride Industry, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 563 ("IMBs provide a cover for
organized prostitution rings that traffic and victimize recently immigrated mail-order
brides.").
65. Epstein, supra note 10, at 79. A few of the many examples commodifying and
stereotyping women include: "Women from Asia value marriage. They do not believe in
divorce. They marry for life. . . . Husband and children never take second place to her
career." http://Heart-of-asia.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2010); "While many women that you
are used to would never cater to you like in old-fashioned times, a Filipina will insist that
she make you more comfortable." http://Manilabeauty.com/faw.phtml (last visited Oct. 18,
2010). Such commodification also results in racially and culturally separating the mailorder brides from U.S. women with "traditional values." Donna R. Lee, Mail Fantasy:
Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail-OrderBride Industry and ProposedLegal Solutions,
5 ASIAN L.J. 139, 145 (1998).
66. GLOBALLADIES, http://datingdepot.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
67. LOVEME.COM, http://loveme.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
68. Epstein, supra note 10, at 81.
69. INS REPORT, supra note 23, at 15; Scholes, supra note 36, at 4. See also Lindee,
supra note 64, at 558-61.
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the Immigration and Nationality Act 70 sets strict nationality quotas to cap
immigration to the United States,7 1 it does not restrict the number of
"immediate relatives" of U.S. citizens permitted to immigrate each year.72
Nuclear family members, particularly children, parents, and spouses,
qualify as "immediate relatives."7
However, due to quota limitations,
spouses and other immediate relatives of permanent residents 74 must wait
for about one year to receive a visa, while there is almost no waiting
period for spouses of U.S. citizens.
In the 1980s, immigration marriage fraud became a significant public
policy concern as "spouses of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens
are ... given special consideration under our immigration laws, [and] many
aliens who would not otherwise be allowed to live in the United States find
it expedient to enter into fraudulent marriage." 7 7 To commit marital fraud
outside the immigration context, a spouse must lie about willingness or
ability to procreate or engage in sexual intercourse. 7 8 However, when it
comes to investigating immigration fraud, the law focuses on the couple's
intention at the time of their marriage.7 9
70. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et
seq.) [hereinafter INA]. INA is the basic body of immigration law amended by multiple
subsequent acts that are also codified in the latest 2006 version of Title 8 of the United
States Code titled, "Aliens and Nationality."
71. Id. § §201(a)(1) and (c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(1) and (c).
72. Id. § 201(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A).
73. Id. "The term 'spouse', 'wife', or 'husband' do not include a spouse, wife, or
husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not
physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been
consummated." Id. § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(35).
74. "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." Id. §
101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). A lawful permanent resident receives a "green card"
that serves as a work authorization permit and allows travel in and out of the United States.
Rights and Responsibilities of a Permanent Resident, USCIS, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.
uscis.gov (follow "Green Card (Permanent Residence)" hyperlink; then follow "After a
Green Card Is Granted").
75. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Visa Bulletin for December 2010, Bull. No. 27, Vol. IX
(2010), http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5197.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
76. See Immigration Marriage Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Immigration Fraud Hearings] (statement of Sen. Alan K.
Simpson). "By virtue of a simple ceremony taking only a few minutes, marriage to a United
States citizen confers 'most favored alien' status on the beneficiary and almost instantly
results in immigrant status as no visa number . . . is necessary." Id. at 7 (statement of INS
Commissioner Alan C. Nelson).
77. 132 Cong. Rec. H27.015 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Romano L.
Mazzoli).
78. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation ofMarriage, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1625, 1682 (2007).
79. Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975) (established the principle that for
purposes of immigration, a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to
establish a life together at the time they were married").
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Congress enacted the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986 (IMFA) 0 to balance the competing policies of family reunification
IMFA granted a two-year "conditional
and marriage fraud prevention.
resident" status to immigrant spouses, 82 which immigration officials could
revoke83 if they determined that the marriage was "entered into for the
purpose of procuring an alien's admission as an immigrant."8 4 A
commissioner of the INS, which controlled immigration at the time,
testified before Congress that marriage fraud posed a significant threat to
the integrity of the immigration system because marriage was the most
The
frequent means used to obtain permanent resident status."
commissioner pointed to an INS survey which indicated that at least thirty
percent of petitions for immigrant spouse's right of entry were fraudulent.
Four years later, the INS conceded in court that the survey was
invalid. As it turns out, the INS collected data from only three cities and
calculated the high fraud percentage from suspected fraud cases in those
Moreover, the INS never determined
cities-not actual cases of fraud.
the number of cases involving immigration marriage fraud before Congress
passed IMFA.89
Congress insisted on legislating as if foreign bride marriages are
fraudulent despite data that suggested otherwise. The rate of fraud
Congress attributed to immigration marriages dropped to eight percent in
1996,90 and one percent in 1999.91 One report to Congress noted, "At a rate
of 1 percent, then, this study did not demonstrate a significant role played
by the matchmaking industry in marriage fraud." 92 Despite these findings,
an INS-funded study listed as an appendix to the 1999 report claims:
There is no question that many of the alien women who advertise
for U.S. husbands are far more interested in gaining permanent
residence alien status than in gaining a good marriage. What

80. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IMFA].
81. H.R. REP. No. 99-906, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978
[hereinafter H.R. REP.] ("The purpose of the bill is to deter immigration related marriage
fraud.").
82. IMFA § 2(a)(1) (1986), 8 U.S.C. § 1 186a(a)(1) (2006) (amending INA § 216); id. §
2(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(B).
83. Id. §2(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(C).
84. Id. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i).
85. Immigration FraudHearings,supra note 75, at 6-7 (statement of INS Commissioner
Alan C. Nelson).
86. Id. at 35, 69.
87. Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (W.D. N.C. 1990).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.

INS REPORT, supra note 23, at 13.

91. Id. at 14.
92. Id.
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portion of the women intend to use marriage to gain permanent
resident alien status cannot be ascertained, of course, since we
cannot know what is in the woman's mind, but a reading of the
self-descriptions they offer and their willingness to marry men of
advanced age and dubious character attests to this intention.93
Robert J. Scholes, a professor of linguistics at the University of Florida
at the time of the study, composed the report.94 Despite distrust of the
intentions of "alien women," Scholes admitted that the "mail-order bride"
source of new U.S. citizens is minute compared to the forty thousand to
fifty thousand annual marriages between U.S. and foreign nationals where
the couple met through other means.95 Therefore, Congress disproportionately besmirches foreign bride marriages, and consequently, foreign
brides.
B. WHAT IS A FRAUDULENT MARRIAGE?
Despite the lack of evidence regarding fraud, immigration law singles
out immigrant bride marriages as suspicious and therefore unreasonably
stigmatizes these marriages as less than facially valid. The assumption that
marriages of couples who meet via international Internet sites are
fraudulent begs the question, what is a fraudulent marriage? Congress
appears to define marital fraud by regulating the creation and existence of
Laws enacted to control
marriages involving foreign spouses.
immigration-related marital fraud impose deadlines and invasively intrude
into the marriage to inquire whether the couple meets the rather ambiguous
"bona fide marriage" requirement.
1. Time Restrictions and Immigration Dependency
One time restriction created by the Immigration and Nationality Act
requires an immigrant fiancee to wed her visa sponsor within ninety days
of arrival. 9 6 The function of the ninety-day requirement is to prevent
immigrants from using the K-1 fiancee visa as a substitute for long-term
permanent resident status.97 The requirement is further evidence of distrust

93. Scholes, supra note 36, at 7.
94. Robert J. Scholes, How Many Mail-Order Brides?, 28 IMMIGR. REv. 10 (1997),
Scholes's basis for his
available at http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/IR28/IR28.pdf.
claimed expertise on immigration is uncertain.
95. Id. According to Scholes, the stream of mail-order brides who would otherwise not
be able to enter the U.S. creates a "future chain of migration" as the women petition for
parents and siblings. Id. Furthermore, Scholes claims that the perception that the mailorder brides have succeeded in "dramatically improving their lives may encourage still more
foreign women to seek this route into the United States." Id.
96. INA § 101(a)(15)(K) (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (2006). Although INA
regulates the entry of engaged men and women, the term fianc6e, a woman engaged to be
married, will be used in this Note to preserve focus on the immigration status of immigrant
brides.
97. Abrams, supranote 78, at 1651-52.
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of marriages involving immigration issues. While state marriage licenses
eventually expire if the couple has not wed, the consequence for failing to
marry within the allotted time is simply having to apply for another
In contrast, failure to marry within ninety days of
marriage license.
arriving on a K-1 immigration visa can result in deportation.99 This places
foreign brides in the predicament of choosing between returning to
desperate situations in their home countries or enduring the abuse in hopes
of a better life later on.
As Susanna's case that was mentioned at the beginning of this Note
demonstrated, ninety days is a short amount of time for a couple who met
over the Internet to make an important life decision regarding marriage.
No U.S. law requires two people to wed within a particular amount of time,
except if a foreign spouse is involved. The consequence of such
stigmatization is severe as the ninety-day limit facilitates hasty, poorly
informed marital decisions that arguably lead to domestic discord and
abuse to which foreign brides are already vulnerable.
Another time-related provision that immigration law forces upon
foreign bride marriages requires that if a couple has been married for less
than two years, the foreign spouse must wait until the second anniversary
before she is able to obtain permanent residency. 00 IMFA drafters opined
that the two-year condition on marriages involving immigrants is necessary
to prevent marriage fraud as it is difficult to sustain appearance of a bona
fide marriage over such a long period of time.10 During the provisional
twenty-four months, the immigrant bride only has "conditional" permanent
residency.10 2 She is subject to deportation if immigration authorities
determine that the marriage is not bona fide but, instead, entered into for
immigration reasons.1 03 To remove her conditional immigration status, the
foreign spouse must jointly petition with her husband within ninety days of
the second anniversary of the conditional status grant.104 Not surprisingly,
the joint petition requirement creates problems for battered spouses whose
husbands refused to sign the petition.
2. Defining and Intruding Into a "Bona Fide Marriage"
Marital privacy is a primary concern of state courts, which loathe
intruding into marriages,' 0 5 even to investigate suspected marriage fraud.10 6

98. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1651-52.
99. INA § 214(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d).
100. IMFA § 2(g)(1)(C) (1986), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g)(1)(C) (2006) (amending INA §
203(a)).
101. H.R. REP., supra note 81, at 5981-82.
102. IMFA § 2(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) (amending INA § 216).
103. Id. § 2(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b).
104. Id. § 2(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d).
105. The doctrine evolved from McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226 (1953), in which a
wife sued her husband for support during marriage. Although Mr. McGuire was wealthy, he
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According to the modem marital privacy doctrine, U.S. citizens are free to
determine how to structure their marriage. 0 7 For example, the couple is
free to live together or apart, use the same or different last names, have or
abstain from sexual relations, and have separate or joint bank accounts. 108
The state will not examine these marital conditions unless a court must
make a judgment in divorce proceedings.109
In stark contrast to the "hands off' approach to marriages between
domestic couples, immigration courts and administrative officials closely
monitor marriages involving foreign spouses. IMFA requires immigration
officials and courts to look at the couple's intent at the time of the marriage
to determine whether the marriage is bona fide or a sham entered into
solely to attain legal immigration status." 0 A marriage certificate indicates
the legality of the marriage, but is insufficient to show the reason the
couple entered into the marriage. To establish intent, courts closely
investigate whether the couple functions as a family unit, something courts
avoid outside of the foreign bride context.''
Bark v. INS established that a marriage is fraudulent if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together." 2 A couple may fail the
Bark test if, for example, they married to hide sexual identity, or to
conceive a child. However, the same marriage will pass the IMFA test as
long as the couple married for reasons other than immigration benefits." 3
Synthesizing both tests, immigration officials generally look to the
following types of evidence when investigating whether a marriage is
"bona fide": (1) documentation showing joint ownership of property, (2)

refused to install a toilet, a shower, or a kitchen sink in the house. McGuire, 157 Neb at
229. McGuire refused to give his wife any spending money and she had had no new clothes
for at least four years. Id. The court refused to intervene, holding that the living standards
of a household are for the family, not the courts, to determine. Id. at 238.
106. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1680. This court reluctance commonly arises in
annulment cases, in which hiding a serious drinking problem or lying about income or
prospects are insufficient to demonstrate fraud. Id. State courts will only find fraud when a
spouse has misrepresented capacity or willingness to procreate or have sexual intercourse.
Id.
107. While the marriage of heterosexual couples is mainly free from federal regulation,
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) does limit homosexual marriage. DOMA defines
"marriage" to be "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and
the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
108. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding a broad
right to marital privacy and finding government control of contraception and other
relationship-oriented marital decisions "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship").
109. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1680.
110. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5)(vi) (2006) (requiring "documentation establishing that the
marriage was not entered into in order to evade the immigration laws of the United States").
111. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1680.
112. 511 F.2dat 1201.
113. See Abrams, supra note 78, at 1685.
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lease showing joint tenancy, (3) documentation showing commingling of
financial resources, (4) birth certificates of children born to the marriage,
(5) affidavits of third parties who have knowledge of the relationship, and
(6) other documentation establishing that the marriage was not entered into
in order to evade U.S. immigration laws.' 14 The test is designed to require
immigration officials to delve more deeply into the functionality of the
marriage, as opposed to relying solely on a formal requirement such as
obtaining a marriage certificate."'
Proving bona fides can be difficult, for a marriage certificate may show
that a couple was legally married, but it does not show the reason they
married. Thus, in combating fraud, immigration officials frequently look
for more-they seek to determine whether the couple is acting married,
even though they have the legal documentation to prove that they actually
are married."1
Not only is the "bona fide marriage" test invasive, the standards are
ambiguous and empower an immigration official to use his or her own
discretion in determining what a good faith marriage ought to look like.
Andrea Quarantillo, a district director of an immigration agency in New
York, admits, "The latitude that officers have is broad, and one that has to
be exercised with a lot of care . . .. Is it perfect? No. It's judgmental."' 17
If a couple volunteers information that the wife is pregnant, a question
to the husband follows, "Is it yours?"'"s One immigration official likes to
ask arbitrary questions such as, "What piece of jewelry means the most to
your wife?"ll 9 Recently, The New York Times released a version of a quiz
that investigators give to citizens and their foreign spouses to determine if
the marriage is a sham.120 One reader was surprised that after thirty-six
years of marriage, her husband did not know where she kept her clean
underwear.121 Another wrote, "My wife and I got eight answers wrong!
We're both American citizens who've been married for 10 years. If one of
us were an immigrant, he/she'd probably be on a boat right now."l22
Another reader replied with poetry: "I think that we met in December,! On

114. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5)(i)-(vi).
115. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1683.
116. Id.
117. Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/nyregion/13fraud.html [hereinafter Bernstein, Do You
Take This Immigrant?].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Nina Bernstein, Readers Put Their Marriages Up to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com (search "readers put their marriages up to the test")
[hereinafter Bernstein, Readers].
121. Id.
122. Id.
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second thought maybe September,! But now it appears/ After [s]ixty great
years,/ The truth is I just don't remember."l 2 3
Investigators also often inquire into whether the marriage was
consummated and whether the couple uses some form of birth control.124
"Are they going to ask us what our favorite sex position is, too?" asked a
U.S. citizen expressing outrage at the level of intimate detail that
investigators require. 2 5 Marriages between U.S. citizens are not subjected
to such invasive scrutiny, and not all U.S. couples would pass an
investigation that marriages with foreign spouses must. Not only is the
"bona fide marriage" test contradictory to the marital privacy doctrine, but
the result is legal stigmatization that foreign spouse marriages are less
worthy of privacy protections afforded to non-immigrant marriages.
3. Policing the Marriage
Immigration officials have great difficulty distinguishing "real
marriages" from fraudulent ones, and as a result, some genuine marriages
are not recognized. In the case of Agnes Cho, a Chinese citizen, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held her marriage was a sham despite
evidence of a long courtship, cohabitation, a joint health insurance policy,
and that the spouses met each other's parents.1 26 The BIA found that Cho's
marriage was fraudulent from the start because her husband had an
affair.127 The BIA also reasoned that because Cho moved out after her
husband's violent abuse, Cho married only to receive permanent
residency.12 8 Simply because the marriage broke down, the BIA construed
29
the marriage as fraudulent from the start.1
Although the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,130 the
BIA's decision shows that immigration officials expect more from
marriages involving immigration benefits than from other marriages. Any
marriage may dissolve for a number of benign reasons, such as
employment opportunities or domestic difficulties.131 In theory, "aliens
cannot be required to have more conventional or more successful marriages
than citizens."1 32 In practice, however, the Cho case demonstrates that
immigration judges and the BIA may and do hold marriages involving an

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Bernstein, Readers, supra note 120.
Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?, supranote 117.
Bernstein, Readers,supra note 120.
Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bark, 511 F.2d at 1202.
Id. at 1201-02.
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immigrant spouse to a much higher standard than other marriages.' 33 "By
making spouse a category for gaining immigration status, Congress has
necessarily embroiled DHS in the difficult business of passing judgment on
individual marriages."' 34
Because immigration officials and judges do pass judgments on
marriages involving a foreign spouse, couples are prompted to self-police
their marriage, "crafting the kind of marriages that they think will pass
muster in immigration service interviews even where the marriages they
had anticipated having would have looked much different."l 35 If an
immigrant spouse moves out, it is possible that she may not report that she
no longer lives with her husband because she is worried that the courts will
think her marriage to be fraudulent and place her in removal proceedings.
It is reasonable that immigration officials may construe the fact that the
couple no longer resides together as evidence of a sham marriage.
However, immigration officials have also construed such an omission as
material misrepresentation, which is grounds for removing a spouse's
conditional status and subsequently deporting the foreign spouse.13 6
Whether the marriage was a sham, the foreign spouse's belief that
immigration officials would think that there is a sham and the subsequent
cover-up may result in deportation. 37
Children are also compelling evidence of a bona fide marriage,' 38 but
having children from the marriage will not deter deportation if the marriage
is found to be fraudulent.' 39 As a result, a couple must decide early in the
marriage when they will have children as there is always an incessant risk
of deportation.140 No similar regulation exists for non-immigrant spouses
that so boldly intrudes into coital reproductive choices. Such intrusive
control distinguishes and separates foreign bride marriages from other
marriages.

133. See also Krazoun v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 2003) (surmising that the
BIA had discretion to bypass inquiry into whether Krazoun's third marriage was a sham on
the basis of previous misconduct).
134. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1691.
135. Id.; See Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Comment, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S.
Citizens in the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 U. HAW. L.
REv. 61, 62-80 (1993) (discussing the conflict between cultural marital practices and the
IMFA requirements of pertaining to "bona fide marriage").
136. Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 557-58 (2d Cir. 2005) (when a foreign spouse
filed a petition to remove conditional residency and claimed that he lived with his U.S.
citizen wife when he did not, the court held that a misrepresentation is material if it has a
"natural tendency to influence . .. the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed").
137. Id.
138. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(iv) (2006).
139. Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to the United States: A Case Study of the Adjustment
Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 20, 22
(1989).
140. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1692.
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IV. STIGMATIZATION DETERS LEGAL RECOURSE
To ameliorate the harsh effects of immigration law on foreign brides in
abusive marriages, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) in 1994141 with subsequent amendments in the years 2000142 and

2005.143
A. A STEP FORWARD: SELF-PETITIONING EXCEPTIONS

To remove an abusive spouse's control over a foreign bride's
immigration status, VAWA allows battered spouses to self-petition for
permanent residency status, 1" also known as receiving a "green card." The
self-petition process is also often called a battered spouse waiver, as the
joint petition requirement is waived in domestic violence cases. This legal
remedy is available to the battered spouse who had endured "battery or
extreme cruelty" at the hands of her citizen or legal permanent resident
husband. 145 Battery or extreme cruelty are defined as, but are not limited
to, an act or threat of violence, such as forceful detention, and sexual abuse
Regulations also
including rape, incest, and forced prostitution. 14 6
recognize that domestic violence is a pattern, and while some acts may not
qualify on their own as "an act or threat of violence," the totality of such
acts may amount to battery or extreme cruelty. 147 When a foreign spouse
encounters such heinous domestic abuse, VAWA strips the citizen or LPR
spouse of control over the foreign spouse's immigration process.
If an immigrant spouse has been married to a U.S. citizen or legal
permanent resident for less than two years, she is not directly eligible for

141. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA 1994) is an expansive law that deals
with a variety of issues pertaining to violence against women, such as restraining orders,
sexual assaults on college campuses, housing protection for domestic violence victims, etc.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Titles 8, 18, 20, 28, and 42 of the United States Code).
The part of the Act that is relevant to this Note particularly focuses on non-U.S. citizen
victims of domestic violence and applicable immigration laws. Id. §§ 40701-40703, 108
Stat. 1944-55 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1154, 1186a, 1254).
142. See Violence Against Women Act 2000 (VAWA 2000), Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§
1001-1603, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491-1539 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Titles 8, 18, 20, 28, 42 and 48 of the United States Code). See also id. §§ 1501-1513, 114
Stat. 1518-37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)
(pertaining to immigrant victims of domestic violence).
143. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
(VAWA 2005), Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of Titles 8, 18, 20, 28, and 42 of the United States Code). See also id. §§
801-834, 119 Stat. 3053-77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 8, 22, and
42 of the United States Code) (pertaining to immigrant victims of domestic violence).
144. VAWA 1994 § 40701(a)(1) and VAWA 2000 § 1503(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)
(provisions for battered spouses of abusive U.S. citizens); VAWA 2000 § 1503(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii) (provisions for battered spouses of legal permanent residents).
145. VAWA 1994 § 40701(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1).
146. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2006).
147. Id.
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legal permanent residency. 14 8
Instead, she is granted "conditional
residency," and she and her husband must file a joint petition for
adjustment of status1 49 within ninety days of the two-year anniversary of
the conditional status grant.150 To protect newlywed women in abusive
marriages, a pivotal provision allows battered foreign spouses to selfpetition to adjust their immigration status from conditional to permanent
residency. 5t
VAWA "provisions are designed to ensure that abusers and criminals
cannot use the immigration system against their victims ... including ...
interfering with or undermining their victims' immigration cases, and
encouraging immigration enforcement officers to pursue removal actions
against their victims." 1 5 2 A foreign bride no longer requires her husband's
cooperation in order to preserve or adjust her immigration status. This
means that the abusive husband has fewer ways to use immigration status
in order to control his foreign wife. As a result, VAWA helps to level the
power dynamics in an immigrant bride marriage. The self-petition
exceptions pull U.S. immigration law away from the archaic notion of
coverture, which dictated that the husband owned and controlled his wife.
B. A NEGATIVE PRESUMPTION OF IMMIGRATION FRAUD THROUGH
MARRIAGE REMAINS

Although VAWA ameliorates the time restrictions IMFA placed on
foreign bride marriages, the abused foreign bride still faces several legal
hurdles. In addition to proving that the battered spouse entered marriage in
good faith, that the marriage was legal, and that she was battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty,1 3 the battered spouse also carries the burden
of proving that the marriage was a bona fide marriage.154 The battered
spouse must rebut the negative presumption that she married a U.S. citizen
solely to obtain the benefit of a legal permanent resident status."' The
"bona fide marriage" requirement is difficult to prove due to the ambiguity

148. IMFA § 2(a) (1986), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (creating INA § 216).
149. Id. § 2(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A).
150. Id. § 2(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(2)(A).
151. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, § 701(a) (1990),
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C). Although this self-petition was
established before VAWA, VAWA particularly recognizes immigrant spouses who file such
petitions as "VAWA self-petitioners." VAWA 2005 § 811(a)(51) (2006), 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(51) (2006) (amending INA § 101(a)). See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(i-vi) (explaining
waiver for requirement to file joint petition in order to remove conditional residency status
from battered spouse).
152. Committee of the Judiciary House of Representatives, Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 Through 2009, Sept. 22, 2005,
available at iwp.legalmomentum.org (search "September 22, 2005").
153. INA §§ 204(a)(1)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb) (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb)
(2006).
154. Id. §§ 204(a)(1)(iii)(II)(aa)-(bb), 8 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1)(iii)(II)(aa)-(bb).
155. Id.
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of evidentiary standards and the arbitrary and unpredictable outcomes that
result from discretionary power held by immigration officials.
Instead of presuming that the marriage is facially valid, the current
petitioning requirement places the burden of proof on the immigrant victim.
It is particularly difficult for a battered foreign spouse to carry her burden
of proof because her abusive marriage, dependent economic status, and
language and cultural barriers combine to keep her powerless and
uninformed. The negative presumption combined with the language and
economic difficulties create an almost insurmountable barrier to a
successful petition. The daunting VAWA petition process and the lack of
clear standards for applying discretion over petitions present significant
obstacles to the battered foreign spouse. 1 s6
V. INSUFFICIENT IMB INDUSTRY REGULATION
A. THE IMB BUSINESS AND MORAL TURPITUDE
In addition to insufficient protection resulting from heavy immigration
burdens, foreign brides are also left unprotected by lack of effective
regulation of an industry that sells people. Juries, judges, and the public
have been stunned by the IMB industry's disregard for the immigrant
brides' safety. In Fox v. Encounters International,Nataliya, a Ukrainian
bride, sued the IMB agency because the owner, Natasha Spivack,
intentionally downplayed the gravity and urgency of the physical and
The
mental abuse that Nataliya suffered from her husband, James Fox.'
break
to
abuse began as verbal insults, then escalated when Fox attempted
Nataliya's leg when she was four months pregnant.158 Nataliya sought
Spivack's advice on at least three separate occasions. 159 Despite knowing
about VAWA's battered spouse waiver, Spivack falsely told Nataliya that
nothing worth complaining about was happening and that Nataliya's only
other option would be deportation back to Ukraine.16 0
The abuse culminated in Fox severely beating Nataliya and holding a
gun to her head for over two hours.161 After the incident, Nataliya called an
ambulance due to chest pain and was diagnosed with a broken collar bone,
swelling to her face, numerous contusions, and a human bite to her hand.162
Not until Nataliya reached a women's shelter with her baby did she
discover the existence of the battered spouse waiver.163

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Del Vecchio, supra note 60, at 215.
2006 U.S. App. Lexis 9269.
Id. at *9.
Del Vecchio, supra note 60, at 281.
Fox, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 9296 at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
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The jury found that Spivack and her agency, Encounters International
(EI), had a fiduciary duty to Nataliya.'" Furthermore, the court held that
Spivack intentionally withheld information about the battered spouse
waiver, and that Nataliya reasonably relied on Spivack's advice to her
detriment.165 The jury awarded Nataliya $92,000 in compensatory damages
and $341,500 in punitive damages,' 6 6 which the court found not excessive
The court was
considering Spivack's reprehensible misconduct.' 67
especially repulsed by Spivack's immoral conduct to "gain Plaintiffs
[Nataliya's] trust, confidence, and loyalty in order that Plaintiff would
marry James Fox, continue to be married to James Fox, and create another

El success story."l 68
In another case, European Connections v. Gonzales, a federal district
court recognized that for-profit IMBs have incentives to disregard
immigrant brides' safety.1 69 Matchmaking services are more concerned
with the satisfaction of the paying male customers than with safeguarding
the female clients.17 0 Regulating IMBs' recruiting practices and standards
of care toward foreign brides would likely save women's lives.
B. POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

1. Groom's Background and Criminal History
After more than two decades of investigating husbands' abuse of
immigrant brides, Congress passed the International Marriage Broker
IMBRA requires IMBs to collect and
Regulation Act (IMBRA)."'
distribute to the potential bride information about a particular U.S. male
client before that client may initiate contact. 17 2 The IMBs must search
public sex offender registries, obtain the client's criminal history for violent
crimes, including domestic violence, sexual abuse, and child abuse, as well
as any arrests related to drugs and alcohol. 73 If an IMB gives a client
information about a potential bride before conducting the requisite
research, that IMB is subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties,
including up to a $25,000 penalty for each improper disclosure.174

164. Fox, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 9296 at *18.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *29. Fox settled for $115,000. Id. at *26.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *20.
169. 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
170. Id.
171. Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 831-834, 119 Stat. 2960, 3066-77 (2006) (codified as §§
1375a, 1184, and other sections scattered in 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IMBRA].
172. Id. § 833(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1375(d)(2).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 833(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1375a(d)(5)(A) (holding IMBs liable for civil
penalties from $5,000 to $25,000 dollars); id. § 833(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1375a(d)(5)(B)
(subjecting non-compliant IMBs to a criminal fine and imprisonment for no more than five
years).
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The disclosure requirement only applies to organizations that explicitly
advertise foreign nationals for marriage with U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents.' 7 5 IMBRA defines IMBs narrowly, so as not to affect
domestic matchmaking organizations. This "Match.com exemption"176
applies to online dating services, which do not rely on international
dating.177 The domestically operating IMBs must charge comparable rates
and offer comparable services to all of its clients, regardless of the clients'
gender or nationality.' 78 This measure explicitly protects the right of adults
to court in whatever fashion they choose without passing judgment on
Internet dating, but also recognizes the power imbalances involved when
the Internet-based industry advertises destitute foreign women.
2. Limits on Fianc6e Petitions
In addition to the disclosure requirements, IMBRA limits the number
of fianc6e petitions a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident may request
within a particular time period.'7 9 Prior to IMBRA, there was no official
limit to the number of fianc6e or spouse visas for which an individual
citizen could apply. Now, a petitioner must wait two years between
petitions. 8 0 If a citizen or legal permanent resident has petitioned for two
K-1 visas in the past ten years, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) must notify the immigrant fianc6e that the petition pertaining to her
is the male's third petition.'"'
Anastasia's story illustrates why petition sponsors must be monitored.
In 1998, Anastasia, an eighteen-year-old foreign bride, immigrated from
Kyrgyzstan to Seattle, Washington, to join her new husband, Indle King.182
King had abused and divorced his previous wife, and he quickly became
violent toward Anastasia as well.18 3 By 2000, King decided that he wanted
to divorce Anastasia.184 Because he was unwilling to pay for divorce
proceedings, King recruited an accomplice to help him kill Anastasia. 8 1
King, who weighed almost three hundred pounds, pinned Anastasia to the
ground while his accomplice choked her with a necktie.1 86 Anastasia's

175. IMBRA § 833 (4)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1375a(e)(4)(A)-(B).
IMBRA passed
constitutional scrutiny in at least one federal court. See European Connections and Tours
Inc., v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that IMBRA violates
neither the First, Fifth, nor Fourteenth Amendments).
176. Abrams, supra note 78, at 1656.
177. IMBRA § 833(e)(4)(B) (2006), 8 U.S.C. § 1375a(e)(4)(B) (2006).
178. Id.

179. Id. § 832(a)(4)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(r)(4)(B)(i).
180. Id.
181. Id. § 832(a)(4)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(r)(4)(B)(ii).
182.

TAHIRIH,

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Illustrative Cases, supra note 2.
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body was found in a shallow grave.8 As it turns out, while he plotted to
kill Anastasia, King was already seeking another immigrant bride.188
IMBRA-mandated criminal background checks and petition limits
potentially protect foreign brides from sorrowful fates such as Anastasia's.
While the notification and criminal background check provisions were
designed to limit serial exploitation and harm of immigrant brides,
IMBRA's efficacy suffered a practical downfall. To be effective, the
government had to implement IMBRA provisions to ensure that the foreign
brides were receiving information about potential grooms' criminal
backgrounds and the number of fianc6e petitions they had previously
sponsored.
C. IMBRA FALLS SHORT OF PROTECTING FOREIGN BRIDES
1. Implementation Roadblocks
A 2008 study conducted by the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that USCIS, the Department of State
(DOS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have implemented only some
of the key IMBRA provisions. 89 The provisions not implemented were
those meant to provide potential immigrant spouses with crucial
information about the citizens sponsoring their spouse or fianc6e visas.
First, the DOS did not comply with the IMBRA mandate that DOS
mail a copy of the visa petitioner's background check to the foreign
bride.190 Second, USCIS failed to cross-check fianc6e and spouse visa
petitions to see if the petitioner had petitioned previously for someone
else.191 In fact, USCIS only investigated petitioners who admitted that they
had previously filed petitions.192 Third, USCIS officials admitted that they
no longer tried to notify beneficiaries of petitions approved within the last
ten years.' 93 USCIS explained that it was too difficult to obtain the correct
overseas contact information.19 4 As a result, foreign brides have been
deprived of required information regarding their potential spouses.' 95

187. TAHIRIH, Illustrative Cases,supra note 2.
18 8. Id.

189. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL MARRIAGE
BROKER REGULATION ACT OF 2005: AGENCIES HAVE IMPLEMENTED SOME, BUT NOT ALL OF
4 (Aug. 2008), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-862
[hereinafter GAO].
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 5 (as required by IMFA § 832(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(r)(B)(i)
(2006)).
192. Id.
193. Id. (as required by IMFA § 832(a)(4)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(r)(4)(B)(ii)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 6.
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a. Information Pamphlet for Battered Immigrant Spouses
GAO also criticized USCIS for not completing an informational
pamphlet discussing the visa application process and available resources
for victims of domestic violence. 196 However, in October 2010, USCIS
released a fact sheet relating information about the immigration process
and available domestic violence protection. 19 7 The seven-page fact sheet is
divided into two parts, the first dealing with resources available to victims
of domestic violence, including calling 911 or requesting protection orders,
and the second focusing on victims' immigration rights.198
However, the fact sheet is currently only available in English and only
on the USCIS website.199 This might present problems to battered
immigrant brides who do not speak English well, lack knowledge of how to
use the Internet, or have limited or no Internet access due to the battering
spouse's control. Furthermore, it is not clear whether any of the help
hotlines listed offer multilingual services. More importantly, the pamphlet
does not state explicitly that a victim of domestic violence will not be
deported if she seeks help from the police or immigration authorities.
While USCIS does state that domestic and sexual abuse is illegal in the
United StateS200 and that "[a]ll people, regardless of immigration or
citizenship status, are guaranteed basic protections under both civil and
criminal law," 20 1 frequent recommendations to contact a family or
immigration lawyer202 inspire little confidence in the self-petitioning
process. Never lifting the burden from the battered spouse, the fact sheet
warns, "Ultimately, you are responsible for deciding whether you feel safe
in the relationship. 2 03
Nor does USCIS define what a "good faith" marriage is and what an
immigrant victim must do to meet the requirements.204 The only guidance
a battered immigrant spouse has is that to remove conditional residency
"you must prove the marriage is in 'good faith' and valid," and that all

196. GAO, supra note 189, at 6 (as required by IMFA § 833, 8 U.S.C. § 1375a).
197. Information on the Legal Rights Available to Immigrant Victims of Domestic
Violence in the United States and Facts about Immigrating on a Marriage-Based Visa Fact
Sheet, USCIS, Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.uscis.gov (search "legal rights available to
immigrant victims") [hereinafter IMBRA Fact Sheet].
198. Id.
199. A USCIS website search for a multi-language pamphlet only revealed a two-page
pamphlet in English, Russian, and Chinese titled, "Immigration Options for Victims of
Crimes: Information for Law Enforcement, Healthcare Providers, and Others" that briefly
mentions VAWA and by virtue of its subtitle is not meant to educate battered immigrants.
USCIS, http//:www.uscis.gov (last visited Nov. 15, 2010), (search "immigration options for
victims of crime").
200. IMBRA Fact Sheet, supra note 197, at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2, 7.
203. Id. at 7.
204. Id. at 5.
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three waivers to joint petition to remove conditional residency "require you
to prove your marriage was in 'good faith' and not fraudulent."20 5 As a
result, USCIS leaves a battered spouse without a guideline by which to
decide whether she would qualify as a self-petitioner. The battered spouse
faces a gamble that she may not qualify. This consequently diminishes the
likelihood that a battered spouse will leave the abusive marriage or report
the abuse. Despite USCIS's release of the fact sheet, GAO's concern that
foreign brides are more likely to be unaware of their immigration rights and
safety resources if the pamphlet is not translated or distributed remains
valid.206
In addition, the Tahirih Justice Center, which works to protect female
immigrants from gender-based violence, observed that the pamphlet
circulation plan proved problematic, as it called for distributing the
pamphlet to immigrant brides during consular and adjustment interviews,
which visa sponsors frequently attend.20 7 As a result, these interviews are
not the optimal places for victims of domestic violence to read the
distributed safety information, as the abusers are frequently looking over
their shoulders. 208 Moreover, an abusive sponsor may confiscate the
pamphlet and react angrily against the immigrant bride, thus reversing the
goal of providing for immigrant brides' safety.209 Due to such lapses,
immigrant brides are still a class of women who are, and for an
indeterminate amount of time will be, vulnerable to more domestic
violence.
b. Prosecution of IMBRA Violations
Lastly, GAO was concerned that none of the federal departments in
charge of implementing IMBRA had appointed an agency to investigate,
refer, and prosecute potential IMBRA violations.21 0 On October 13, 2009,
the Department of Justice released a fact sheet, on which a bullet point
stated that when the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
(OCAHO), operated within the DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration
Review, "begins to receive cases regarding international marriage brokers

205. IMBRA Fact Sheet, supra note 197, at 5.
206. GAO, supra note 189, at 4.
207. Id. at 20-21. During an interview at a U.S. Consulate, an immigration official
reviews documents and asks the fianc6(e) questions to determine eligibility for the K-i visa.
See e.g., Cathy Tran Reck, Consular Interviewfor K1 Fiance Visa, HG.org, June 15, 2010,
http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=19100. If already in the United States, a fianc6e or new
spouse may apply to adjust immigration status from nonimmigrant or temporary immigrant
See generally USCIS, Adjustment of Status,
to that of a permanent resident.
http://www.uscis.gov (follow "Green Card (Permanent Residence)" hyperlink; open "Green
Card Processes and Procedures" link, select "Adjustment of Status") (last visited Oct. 24,
2010).
208. GAO, supra note 189, at 20-21.
209. Id. at 21.
210. Id.
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who are charged with violating this [IMBRA background check
dissemination] requirement, OCAHO's [administrative law judges] will
adjudicate these cases."2 1 1 There is no mention of how OCAHO will
receive such cases, whether through government or private citizen sources,
and whether it has started to prosecute IMBRA violations. Furthermore,
the IMBRA fact sheet, which is supposed to provide battered spouses with
resources, does not mention how and where one is to report an IMB that
failed to transmit vital background history to the woman who has now as a
result become a domestic violence victim. 2 12 Therefore, although Congress
enacted IMBRA to regulate the IMB industry and make it safer for foreign
women, it seems IMBs continue to operate without much, if any, actual
federal oversight.
2. Power Imbalance Remains
IMBRA was enacted under the assumption that once informational
imbalances are corrected, the foreign bride will be on equal footing with
the consumer husband to enter into a marriage contract freely.213 Such
conjecture ignores the pervasive economic imbalances inherent to the IMB
industry.214 Women from countries with meager employment opportunities
and social benefits often become foreign brides because the industry has
become successful at commodifying women from poor foreign regions as a
gender, taking advantage of their hope of improving their lives.215
Immigrant brides are incentivized to stay in an abusive relationship for at
least two years in order to gain permanent residency. The women have
"everything to gain from entering into this arrangement and staying in it, no
matter what the circumstances."2 16
IMBRA also does not resolve the problem the information with which
an immigrant bride is provided may be incomplete or incorrect, as is
currently the case. However, even if all of the IMBRA safeguards were in
place, the power imbalance inherent in the consumer-oriented nature of the
IMB industry may be so fundamental as to reduce to impossibility the
informed consent of a foreign bride regarding her potential husband's
record of violence.2 17

211.

News Release: EOIR's Office of the ChiefAdministrativeHearing Officer, DEP'T OF
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/OCAHOFactSheetREVISED I
01309.htm.
212. IMBRA Fact Sheet, supra note 197, at 6-7 (describing how the U.S. government
regulates IMBs through penalties and requirements, but not mentioning prosecution of IMBs
for violations, nor how one may report an IMB in violation of the law).
213. Lindee, supra note 64, at 580.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 581.

JUSTICE

216.

INS REPORT, supranote 23, at 8.

217.

Lindee, supra note 64, at 581.
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Furthermore, IMBRA addresses the domestic violence problem as if it
were a problem solely within the boundaries of a relationship between the
male consumer and the foreign bride.2 18 This approach again highlights
IMBRA's inattention to economic, social, gender, age, education, and other
conditions that drive the disparity between the bride and her husband that
in turn fuels the IMB industry.
In sum, IMBRA protects the immigrant brides as long as they are
victims of domestic violence, ignoring that they are also victims of
fundamental forces that contribute to the existence and success of the IMB
industry. 21 9 Because IMBRA does not recognize that merely providing
foreign brides with information is insufficient protection and that these
women are victims of more than domestic violence, IMBRA does not truly
correct the power imbalance that endangers immigrant brides.
VI. RECOMMENDED REMEDIES TO ALLEVIATE
STIGMATIZATION
First driven by preventing immigration fraud, then by concern for the
well-being of foreign brides, U.S. legislators have yet to find a way to
effectively balance these two interests. The following section suggests a
number of solutions, yet this Note recognizes that no one solution is
enough to solve the profound problem of abuse and stigma that emanate
from U.S. immigration law and the IMB industry.
A.

END LEGAL STIGMATIZATION OF FOREIGN BRIDE MARRIAGES

Immigration law's assumption that foreign bride marriages are
fraudulent stigmatizes the foreign wives or fianc6es as women less
deserving of independent relationship decisions, thus reducing their
autonomy and increasing their vulnerability to domestic violence.
1. Remove "Must Marry Within Ninety Days of Arrival" Deadline
INA's requirement that a foreign woman must wed her K-i visa
sponsor within ninety days of arrival or face deportation 220 takes away a
woman's decision about the timing of the marriage, leading to hasty, poorly
informed decisions regarding marriage. One possible solution is to extend
the ninety-day deadline to at least six months to allow the bride to
acclimate and interact with her future husband in what will be her home
environment. Despite the aim to protect foreign brides, the government
may be unwilling to consider this solution in view of the policy preventing
immigrants from using the K-i visa as a substitute for long-term resident
status. 22 1

218.
219.
220.
221.

Lindee, supra note 64, at 583.
Id. at 583-84.
INA § 101(a)(15)(K)(i) (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i) (2006).
Abrams, supra note 78, at 1651-52.
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Another solution is to require the petitioning spouse and foreign bride
to be in contact for a particular period of time, for example six months or
one year, and for the petitioner to visit the bride at least once, if not twice,
before the bride actually arrives in the United States.222 Such a requirement
would allow the bride to become better acquainted with her future spouse
and his character before being forced to make a decision whether or not to
marry. Furthermore, instead of the groom simply "ordering" his bride
online, required contact time also has the potential to eliminate notions of
ownership and reduce domestic violence after marriage as the couple has
time to build a relationship. While this certainly regulates the courtship
stage, the contact requirement is significantly less intrusive than the
government probing into an existing marriage to see whether it satisfies the
ambiguous "bona fide marriage" requirement.
2. Shifting the Fraudulent Marriage Presumption Away from the
Victim
VAWA-enacted self-petitions are a move in the right direction to
reduce control of abusive husbands and instead empower foreign brides to
control their own immigration process. However, the "bona fide marriage"
requirement is the underlying cause of legal stigmatization of foreign
brides, as the immigrant victim bears the burden of proving that she entered
into the marriage for purposes other than immigration benefits.2 23 An
immigrant victim has a particularly difficult time carrying her burden of
proof due to abuse, lack of financial resources, and language barriers.
Rather than battle a negative presumption, a foreign bride who has been
subjected to extreme cruelty should be able to petition for immigration
benefits.22 4 In cases of severe domestic abuse, the USCIS should be the
party who must surmount a legal burden. Unless the government has
evidence that the marriage was entered into for fraudulent reasons, the
abused spouse should be granted permanent residency status. Otherwise,
as the current situation shows, stigmatization of a marriage as a "mail-order
bride" marriage results in a lack of legal recourse for the abused spouse.
Moreover, presuming that a foreign bride marriage is facially valid would
align U.S. immigration policy with the prevailing concept of freedom of
marital relations recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.2 25

222. IMFA actually struck out the requirement that the foreign fianc6e and petitioning
citizen or legal permanent resident must have previously met in person within two years of
filing for a K-1 fianc6e visa, and instead allocated the Attorney General with discretion to
waive the requirement that the parties must have met in person. IMFA § 3 (1986), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1184(d) (2006) (amending NA § 214(d)).
223. INA § 204(a)(l)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb).
224. Del Vecchio, supra note 60, at 214-15.
225. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding invasion into marital life "repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship").
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MORE EFFICIENT REGULATION OF THE IMB INDUSTRY

To effectively regulate the IMB industry, U.S. legislators must enforce
IMBRA. U.S. legislators should also bolster IMBRA with further domestic
regulation, as well as with international laws that improve the power
imbalance that drives the industry.
1. Enforcing IMB Compliance
a. Improve Domestic Regulation
Although OCAHO at the DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration
Review is supposed to be prosecuting IMBRA violations, DOJ has not
publicized such prosecutions. Part of the problem may be that there have
been little, if any, IMB prosecutions. Despite the fact that the very name of
the International Marriage Brokerage Regulation Act points to its purpose
to regulate IMBs, IMBRA remains almost symbolic in nature. As a result,
IMBs feel no pressure to modify their practices, and IMBRA is not helping
to stem domestic violence against immigrant battered spouses.
Accordingly, DOJ must start filing cases against violating IMBs and
publicizing these cases to convince IMBs that IMBRA compliance is in
their best interest.
A fairly low-cost solution that would hold more violating IMBs
accountable is the creation of a cause of action for advocacy groups to act
as private attorneys general and police the IMB industry.22 6 Without
initiating costly litigation proceedings, advocates would be able to file
complaints against individual IMB companies and their clients for IMBRA
violations and harm against foreign brides. A civil action would follow if
the company or individual against whom the complaint was made refused
to acknowledge wrongdoing and alter practices or behavior.
U.S. law must also impose a code of conduct upon IMBs and hold
them liable to a high standard of client care. Client care standards enforced
by legal statutes would help to prevent situations of reprehensible conduct,
such as that exhibited by Spivack of Encounters International, who insisted
that a battered client remain with her extremely abusive spouse in order to
"create another El success story."227 IMBs' concern with the satisfaction of
paying male customers cannot and should no longer trump the rights,
safety, and, in many instances, lives of foreign brides. Regulation of
IMBs' standards of care toward female clients would potentially save the
lives of many women.

226. Lindee, supra note 64, at 600-01. In 2004, California passed the Private Attorneys
General Act, a state labor code provision that allows private individuals to report employer
violations to a state commission. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 (West 2009). If a
claim is successful, the state shares twenty-five percent of the fine required by the law with
the employee in addition to any other money owed to the employee. Id. § 2699(i).
227. Fox, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9269 at *20.
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b. Fostering International Cooperation
In order to effectively diminish exploitation and stigmatization of
foreign brides, countries must come to an international consensus on how
to regulate IMBs. 2 2 8 Although the demands and concerns of "exporting"
and "importing" countries will not always align, once countries agree on
the issues to be addressed, it will become easier to create more effective
international regulations. 22 9 However, countries must recognize that
regulations are heavily limited by economic and social issues that push
foreign women to participate in the IMB industry.230 International
awareness of the problem must be tied to legislation in arenas of genderbased objectification, employment discrimination, and other areas of daily
and legal life.
2. Inform Foreign Brides
To date, USCIS, DOS, and DOJ have failed to implement key IMBRA
provisions intended to ensure that foreign brides are well-informed of their
rights, particularly the right of abused immigrant victims to separately
petition for permanent residency. 23 1 DOS must mail the foreign bride a
copy of the groom's background check, including number of previously
sponsored K-1 visas. Additionally, USCIS must edit, translate, and
distribute the informational pamphlet that discusses the visa application
process, including the self-petition, as well as available resources for
domestic violence victims. Until these measures are carried out, immigrant
brides will remain deprived of information about their visa sponsors'
backgrounds, as well as their immigration and protection rights.
3. Power Balancing
a. Abolish Immigrant Bride Marriages
One extreme solution to the legal stigmatization and high rates of
domestic violence that ensue from IMBs is to ban such marriages in the
United States. In fact, in Ureneck v. Cui, a Massachusetts court refused to
recognize and enforce a marriage brokerage contract because such
contracts were void as against public policy. 23 2 The court described
marriage brokerage contracts as "pernicious" because they do not draw a
distinction between the motive of the marriage partners or broker and the
propriety of a particular marriage.233 Such contracts are "public mischief,
as they have a tendency to cause matrimony to be contracted on mistaken

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Morgan, supranote 27, at 444; Sims, supra note 27, at 634-35.
Id.
See discussion infra Part VI.B.3: PowerBalancing.
See GAO, supra note 189.
59 Mass. App. Ct. 809 (2003).
Id. at 814.
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principles." 234 At the same time, the court recognized, "Dating or social
referral services contracts that do not contain provisions for payment based
on marriage are not marriage brokerage contracts." 235
Although banning immigrant bride marriages would certainly reduce
domestic violence against foreign women, power dynamics are not
necessarily altered by the ban. At the very least, successful immigrant
bride marriages allow some women a chance to escape poverty.236
Foreclosing the opportunity for women in destitute regions to escape
poverty in the United States likely will shift the domestic abuse problems
and sexual exploitation to other countries.2 37 Furthermore, given the
popularity of foreign bride marriages in the United States, the movement
could go underground, which may result in even more egregious abuses of
foreign brides.2 38
b. Information and Guidance from Non-Governmental
Organizations
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) created to address the social
issues that serve as impetus for reform of the foreign bride industry may be
better positioned than governments to resolve the power discrepancies
existing between foreign women and domestic men.2 3 9 Potential brides
would be able to contact the NGOs to obtain information and guidance
regarding the immigration and assimilation processes. NGOs in demand
countries that help victims of domestic violence would be, and in some
cases such as the Tahirih Justice Center, already are, helpful resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even with VAWA provisions that afford self-petition exceptions to
battered immigrant brides, and the IMBRA regulations that attempt to
control IMBs, Congress still needs to respond to the power inequities that
exist between the immigrant bride and the consumer husband because the
agencies charged with their implementation have failed to act effectively.
Furthermore, immigration law must remove from the battered immigrant
bride the burden of overcoming the negative presumption that the marriage
was entered into solely for the purpose of obtaining legal permanent
residency status. Congress must recognize that "whatever the nature of
relationships that individuals might choose, the immigration law should not

234. Ureneck, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 812.
235. Id. at 814.
236. Vanessa B. M. Vergara, Comment, Abusive Mail-Order Bride Marriages and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 94 Nw. U.L. REv. 1547, 1594-95 (2000).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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240. Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture 's
Diminishment, But Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 153, 199 (2004).
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